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Abstract
Part I of this Note will discuss the manner in which ICSID arbitration acts as a contractual
substitute for litigation before national courts. Part II will review the decision of the ICSID tribunal
in Amco Asia Corp. In Part III, the Note will examine the confidentiality requirement imposed by
the ICSID Convention and the Arbitration Rules, and will discuss the arguments for and against
keeping arbitral proceedings secret. In light of this examination and discussion, the Note will argue
that the ICSID tribunal correctly denied injunctive relief to Indonesia, although the denial may be
inconsistent with the spirit of confidentiality traditionally associated with arbitral proceedings.
This Note will conclude by recommending that article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention be changed
to reflect a presumption against confidentiality, and in favor of the publication of awards.
CONFIDENTIALITY IN ICSID ARBITRATION AFTER
AMCO ASIA CORP. v. INDONESIA: WATCHWORD
OR WHITE ELEPHANT?
INTRODUCTION
One of the attractive aspects of arbitration, in comparison
to judicial proceedings, is its confidentiality,' which enables
business enterprises to settle their disputes privately.2 Confi-
dentiality appears to be the watchword in the arbitration rules
of institutional arbitration centers.' The confidentiality of ar-
bitral proceedings before the International Centre for Settle-
ment of Investment Disputes4 (ICSID) is protected by article
1. Lalive, Problmes Relatifs d I Arbitrage International, 140 RECUEIL DES COURS DE
L'ACADIMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 573 (1976). "It would appear that
among [its] advantages, the confidential nature of arbitration must be one of the most
important. It is unnecessary to stress the interest that parties with international com-
mercial connections have in maintaining their business secrets and in not alerting the
competition ... or the tax authorities!" Id. (original emphasis) (author's translation);
Yates, Arbitration or Court Litigation for Private International Dispute Resolution: The Lesser qf
Two Evils, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBI-
TRATION-SIXTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 231 (T. Carbonneau ed. 1984). "Confidential-
ity is a critical consideration; in some circumstances, it tips the balance in favor of
arbitration." Id. To be sure, confidentiality is not the only consideration. There are
other considerations in the international context that make arbitration an attractive
contractual substitute to litigation. For example, enterprises engaged in interna-
tional business may be more concerned with the neutrality that an arbitration tribu-
nal affords. See Bagner, Enforcement of International Commercial Contracts by Arbitration:
Recent Developments, 14 CASE W. RES. INT'L L.J. 573 (1982). This concern is especially
true of enterprises with foreign investments where the disputes frequently involve
foreign governments. See Domke, The Settlement of International Investment Disputes, 12
Bus. LAW. 264, 265 (1957).
2. See M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 29:05 (G. Wilner rev. ed. 1985).
The prevalent practice in the United States among institutional and ad hoc arbitral
tribunals is to refrain from publishing awards, and indeed, from explaining the rea-
sons by which the arbitrators reached these decisions. Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral
Awards witi Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of International Transactions, 23
CoI.UM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 581-86 (1985).
3. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES FOR THE ICC COURT
OF ARBITRATION, Appendix 11 (1984). Appendix II states that the "work of the Court
of Arbitration is of a confidential character which must be respected by everyone who
participates in that work in whatever capacity." See also HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL
ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 28-29 passim (E. Cohn, M. Domke & F.
Eisemann eds. 1977) (confidentiality must be respected).
4. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was
created in 1965 by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Be-
tween States and Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17
U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4 I.L.M. 532 Ihereinafter ICSID
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48(5) 5 of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Between States and Nationals of Other States6 (ICSID
Convention) and by ICSID's Rules of Procedure for Arbitra-
tion Proceedings7 (Arbitration Rules). It is, therefore, surpris-
ing that the ICSID arbitral tribunal in Amco Asia Corp. v. Indone-
Convention]. ICSID was created as a forum for the settlement of international in-
vestment disputes "between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or
agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national
of another Contracting State .... ICSID Convention, supra, art. 25(1). The nation-
ality of a corporation party to an ICSID arbitration is determined by its place of in-
corporation or siege sociale. Id. art. 25(2). Thus, when a host country requires that the
foreign investment be made through a locally incorporated subsidiary, the parties
must provide in the arbitration agreement that the subsidiary be treated "as a na-
tional of another Contracting State for the purposes of [the ICSID] Convention." Id.
art. 25(2)(b).
5. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 48(5). Article 48(5) of the ICSID Con-
vention states that the "Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the
parties." Id. In ICSID arbitration, however, the decisions of the tribunals must state
the reasons upon which they are based. Id. art. 52(1)(e).
6. Opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 159, 4 I.L.M. 532 (1965). ICSID was established under the auspices of the
ICSID Convention. As of June 30, 1985, a total of 91 states have signed the ICSID
Convention. Of this number, 87 states have also deposited instruments of ratifica-
tion. ICSID 1985 ANNUAL REPORT, Annex 1 (1985). See generally Amerasinghe, The
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes and Development through the Multina-
tional Corporation, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 793 (1976); Broches, The Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and ATationals of Other States, 136 R.C.A.D.I.
331 (1972).
7. Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules). The Ar-
bitration Rules in effect on the date on which Indonesia and the Claimants consented
to ICSID arbitration are published in INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETrLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID REGULATIONS AND RULES (1968) [hereinafter Arbitra-
tion Rules I]. ICSID Arbitration Rule 6(2) states that all arbitrators "shall keep confi-
dential all information coming to [their] knowledge..."; Rule 15 states that all "de-
liberations of the Tribunal shall take place in private and remain secret"; Rule 31 (2)
states that the "[t]ribunal shall decide, with the consent of the parties, which other
persons . . . may attend the hearings;" Rule 37(2) states that the "minutes of the
hearing.., shall not be published without the consent of the parties"; and Rule 48(4)
states that ICSID "shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties." See
infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text. In 1984, the Arbitration Rules were
amended. Parra, Revised Regulations and Rules, NEWS FROM ICSID, Winter 1985 at 4, 6.
The amended Arbitration Rules are published in INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETrLE-
MENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, ICSID BASIC DOCUMENTS (1985) [hereinafter Arbitra-
tion Rules II]. Rule 48(4) of the Arbitration Rules was amended, while Rule 37 was
revoked entirely. Id. The amendment and revocation of ifiese two rules-even had
they taken place earlier-would not have affected the outcome of the Tribunal's deci-
sion in Amco Asia Corp. because article 44 of the ICSID Convention states that "[a]ny
arbitration proceeding shall be conducted . . . in accordance with the Arbitration
Rules in effect on the date on which the parties consented to arbitration." ICSID
Convention, supra note 4, art. 44.
1986] ICSID ARBITRATION
sia8 refused to enjoin 9 the Claimants 10 from disseminating in-
formation to the press regarding their dispute with the
Government of Indonesia (Indonesia).
Part I of this Note will discuss the manner in which ICSID
arbitration acts as a contractual substitute for litigation before
national courts." Part II will review the decision of the ICSID
tribunal in Amco Asia Corp. 12 In Part III, the Note will examine
8. In re Arbitration Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/1, 23 I.L.M. 351 (1984) (award on jurisdiction), 24 I.L.M. 365 (1985) (deci-
sion on the request of the Republic of Indonesia for recommendation of provisional
measures); see also 24 I.L.M. 1022 (1985) (excerpts of the Tribunal's award on the
merits). A relaxation of the confidentiality rules is also evident in the recent amend-
ment to Arbitration Rule 48(4). See supra note 7. Under the amended rule, ICSID
may now publish excerpts of the legal rules applied by the tribunals. For example, a
summary of the legal rules applied by the tribunal in Amco Asia Corp. was published in
Legal Rules Applied by ICSID Arbitral Tribunals, NEWS FROM ICSID, Summer 1984, at 5.
9. 24 I.L.M. at 365. The injunctive relief sought by Indonesia is governed by
article 47 of the ICSID Convention, supra note 4, and by Rule 39(1) of the Arbitration
Rules, supra note 7. In the context of the ICSID Convention, the injunctive relief
sought is referred to as provisional measures, which may only be recommended by
the ICSID tribunal to the parties. See infra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
10. The Claimants are (a) Amco Asia Corp. (Amco Asia), a Delaware corpora-
tion; (b) P.T. Amco Indonesia (P.T. Amco), an Indonesian corporation; and (c) Pan
American Development Limited (Pan American), a Hong Kong corporation. After an
attempted coup d'6tat in 1965, a "New Order" was established in Indonesia under
the leadership of President Suharto. Seekins, Historical Setting, in INDONESIA: A COUN-
TRY STUDY 1, 53-57 (F. Bunge ed. 1982). The Indonesian Government saw invest-
ment of foreign capital in Indonesia as a necessary prerequisite to the country's eco-
nomic development. Glassburner, Indonesia's New Economic Policy and Its Sociopolitical
Implications, in POLITICAL POWER AND COMMUNICATIONS IN INDONESIA 137, 152-53 (K.
Jackson & L. Pye eds. 1978). Accordingly, in 1967 the Indonesian government en-
acted Law No. 1/1967 [hereinafter the 1967 Foreign Investment Law], granting gen-
erous tax and other concessions, to attract foreign investors to Indonesia. Id. Amco
Asia, like all other foreign investors in Indonesia, was required to submit an Invest-
ment Application to the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) for an
investment license. Article IX of the Investment Application submitted by Amco Asia
provided that any dispute or disagreement was to be brought before ICSID for settle-
ment. 23 I.L.M. at 357. Foreign investors wishing to benefit from the 1967 Foreign
Investment Law may be required, at the discretion of the Indonesian government, to
make their investment through a subsidiary company incorporated under Indonesian
law. Pursuant to this requirement, Amco Asia established P.T. Amco as its Indone-
sian subsidiary. For a general discussion of the 1967 Foreign Investment Law, see
Soemitro, Investment of Foreign Capital in Indonesia, 22 BULL. INT'L FISCAL Doc. 496
(1968). Pan American, a company incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong, be-
came a shareholder of P.T. Amco in 1972, when shares of P.T. Amco were trans-
ferred to Pan American, with the consent of the Indonesian Government. 23 I.L.M. at
371-73.
11. See infra notes 15-53 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
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the confidentiality requirement imposed by the ICSID Conven-
tion and the Arbitration Rules, and will discuss the arguments
for and against keeping arbitral proceedings secret.' 3 In light
of this examination and discussion, the Note will argue that the
ICSID tribunal correctly denied injunctive relief to Indonesia,
although the denial may be inconsistent with the spirit of confi-
dentiality traditionally associated with arbitral proceedings.
This Note will conclude by recommending that article 48(5) of
the ICSID Convention be changed to reflect a presumption
against confidentiality, and in favor of the publication of
awards. "
I. ICSID ARBITRATION AS A CONTRACTUAL SUBSTITUTE
FOR JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Today, most developing countries that allow and en-
courage private foreign investment have generally sought to
protect their rights to control the exploration and utilization of
their natural resources.' 5 These countries' development poli-
cies have been enforced rigorously by their courts.' 6 In a dis-
pute, a foreign investor's concern about the possibility of inad-
equate relief in such courts,' 7 and the inability of local law to
govern complex multinational disputes, have often led the in-
vestor to reject the host country's courts as a viable means of
dispute resolution. 8
Litigating before the investor's own national courts may
not be a satisfactory alternative solution, because some gov-
ernments will simply invoke their right to sovereign immunity
and refuse to recognize a foreign judgment.' 9 Furthermore,
13. See infra notes 84-179 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text. Pursuant to article 65 of the
ICSID Convention,
[a]ny Contracting State may propose amendment of this Convention. The
text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to the Secretary-Gen-
eral not less than 90 days prior to the meeting of the Administrative Council
at which such amendment is to be considered ....
ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 65.
15. de Vries, International Comniercial Arbitration. A Contractual Substi/ntefor National
Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42, 64 (1982).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Domke, supra note 1, at 265.
19. See, e.g., Hornick, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreignfiudgments in hIdoe-
sia, 18 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 97 (1977) (foreign judgments generally may not be executed
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the investor's attempt to obtain personal jurisdiction may also
be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.20 Assuming
that the investor is able to attach the host government's prop-
erty abroad, and thereby gain jurisdiction in rem, his case may
still be dismissed for nonjusticiability under the act of state
doctrine z.2  Thus, "[i]f a foreign government or instrumental-
ity is involved, a provision for arbitration of disputes may well
in Indonesia). Under United States law the investor may seek to attach the property
of the foreign government in satisfaction of the judgment. See RESTATEMENT OF
UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED) § 460 comment a (Tent. Final
Draft 1985). A recent survey made by a West German court, 46 Entsch. BVerfG 342
(1978), suggests that international law does not preclude execution against the prop-
erty of a state on the basis of ajudgment based on a claim not entitled to immunity, if
the property against which execution is sought is not used for a "sovereign" as op-
posed to a commercial purpose. RESTATEMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW (REVISED) § 460 reporter's note 1 (Tent. Final Draft 1985). United States
law, however, prohibits the attachment of foreign governmental property unless it is
related to the claim which gave rise to the judgment. RESTATEMENT OF UNITED
STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED) § 460 comment b (Tent. Final Draft
1985). In the case of a foreign investment, that property is located in the foreign
government's territory.
20. See RESTATEMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED)
§ 451 (Tent. Final Draft 1985). To subject a state to the judicial jurisdiction of an-
other, the private plaintiff must show that there is a connection between the activity
giving rise to the claim and the forum state. Id. comment a. In the context of a for-
eign investment, this would be almost impossible to demonstrate. See also Domke,
supra note 1, at 265.
21. The act of state doctrine is a doctrine ofjudicial restraint initially set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252
(1897) and later reaffirmed in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
428 (1964). See RESTATEMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED)
§ 469 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986). It is therefore a judicial creation of
United States law and its application is not required by the rules of international law.
The courts of most countries have, however, exercised judicial restraint in adjudicat-
ing challenges to expropriations by foreign states. Luther v. James Sagor & Co.,
[1921] 3 K.B. 532 (C.A.) (the United Kingdom court applied the act of state doc-
trine); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Ltd. v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., 1955 I.L.R. 23 (Civil Ct. Rome,
Sept. 13, 1954) (the Italian court applied a narrow construction of the responsibility
of states to foreign investors); Soc. Minera El Teniente, S.A. v. A.G. Norddeutsche
Affinerie, 12 I.L.M. 251 (Landgericht, Hamburg, Jan. 22, 1973) (the West German
court applied local public policy to oust normal rules of conflict of laws). In the
United Kingdom, the House of Lords has adopted the American view of the act of
state doctrine. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Hammer, [1982] A.C. 888, 936-38 (H.L. (E.)).
In many cases, it is likely, therefore, that the host government's act that led to the
dispute will not be reviewable in the courts of the investor's home country. See RE-
STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED) § 469 reporter's
note 12 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986); Schmidt, Arbitration Under the Auspices of the Interna-
tional Centre for Settlement of Investmeut Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision onjuris-
diction in Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica, Inc. v. Government ofJamaica, 17 HARV. INT'L
IL.J. 90, 105 (1976).
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be a necessity from the point of view of the private party." 22
ICSID provides the only arbitral forum created specifically
for the settlement of investment disputes between private for-
eign investors and their host countries.23 The chief merits of
ICSID arbitration are the independence 24 and neutrality 25 of
its arbitral tribunals. ICSID arbitration also provides an exclu-
sive means of settling investment disputes. 6 Pursuant to the
ICSID Convention, national courts of the Contracting States 27
are required to refrain from acting in any manner that could
possibly interfere with the autonomy and exclusivity of ICSID
22. de Vries, supra note 15, at 64. In commercial arbitration agreements be-
tween a private party and a foreign government, however, it remains unclear whether
a waiver of immunity from execution may be implied from an agreement to arbitrate.
RESTATEMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED) § 460 reporter's
note 3 (Tent. Final Draft 1985). In an ICSID arbitration the problem of immunity
from execution does not arise. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
23. Forrestal, Examples of and Reasons for Increased Use of International Arbitration, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES AND GOVERNMENTS 15, 26 (G.
Aksen & R. von Mehren eds. 1982).
24. ICSID arbitration is autonomous in character, in that the arbitration pro-
ceeding is governed by ICSID's own set of procedural rules. Article 44 of the ICSID
Convention provides in relevant part that "[alny arbitration proceeding shall be con-
ducted in accordance with the provisions of this Section and, except as the parties
otherwise agree, in accordance with the Arbitration Rules in effect on the date on
which the parties consented to arbitration .... ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art.
44.
25. The neutrality of the ICSID arbitral tribunal is assured by article 39 of the
ICSID Convention, which provides in relevant part that "[t]he majority of the arbitra-
tors [in the tribunal] shall be nationals of States other than the Contracting State
party to the dispute and the Contracting State whose national is a party to the dispute
.... " ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 39.
26. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 26. Article 26 provides:
Consent of the parties to arbitration under this Convention shall, unless
otherwise stated, be deemed consent to such arbitration to the exclusion of any
other remedy. A Contracting State may require the exhaustion of local admin-
istrative or judicial remedies as a condition to its consent to arbitration
under this Convention.
Id. (emphasis added). ICSID arbitration is therefore exempt from the scrutiny of
national courts. The exception to which article 26 is subject has had little practical
significance. None of the ICSID arbitration clauses known to the secretariat requires
the exhaustion of local remedies. In addition, neither the investment laws of Con-
tracting States that refer the parties to ICSID arbitration for dispute resolution nor
the overwhelming majority of bilateral investment protection treaties, with the excep-
tion of those concluded by Romania, require the exhaustion of local remedies. De-
laume, ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, n.3 (1983).
27. A Contracting State is any country that has become a signatory and has rati-
fied the ICSID Convention. See snpra note 4.
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arbitration. 28  Thus, a national court must refer the parties to
ICSID for a settlement of their dispute whenever that national
court becomes aware that a complaint brought before it may
call for ICSID arbitration.29
The arbitration clause in an investment agreement to
which a foreign sovereign is a party should include a choice of
law provision in addition to procedural rules.30 Article 42 of
the ICSID Convention allows the parties to an arbitration
agreement to choose the substantive law that is to govern a
dispute settlement.3' For practical reasons, some of the details
of routine operations of the investment entity should be gov-
erned by local law. 2 In many instances, however, applying the
law of the host state exclusively will not be satisfactory, be-
cause the unpredictability of its political conditions may often
bring about unfavorable changes in its laws.33 The choice of
law governing dispute settlement should, therefore, take into
28. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, arts. 26 & 27; see Delaume, ICSID Arbitration
in Practice, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 58, 68 (1984).
29. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 26; see Delaume, supra note 26, at 785.
But see Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094
(D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983). The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit refused to refer the parties to ICSID for arbitration. It
merely reversed the decision of the district court, reported at 505 F. Supp. 141
(D.D.C. 1981), on the ground that the Republic of Guinea was entitled to immunity
from suit. Both district and circuit court decisions have been criticized. See Delaume,
supra note 26, at 786-96. The district court should have stayed the proceedings until
such time as a decision may be made by the Secretary-General of ICSID refusing to
exercise jurisdiction over the dispute. Only then would the district court have been
at liberty to resume hearing the case. Id.; see also Delaume, supra note 28, at 68-71;
Note, Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea: Effect
on U.S. Jurisdiction of an Agreement by a Foreign Sovereign to Arbitrate before the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 16 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 451
(1982) [hereinafter Note, Maritime International Nominees Establishment].
30. de Vries, supra note 15, at 74-75.
31. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 42(1). Article 42(1) provides:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as
may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including
its rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be
applicable.
Id. (emphasis added). When the parties to the dispute agree, an ICSID tribunal may
also decide a dispute ex aequo et bono. Id., art. 42(3). See Broches, The Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States: Applicable Lau'
and Default Procedure, in INTERNATIONAl. ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM FOR MARTIN
DOMKE 12-22 (P. Sanders ed. 1967).
32. See dce Vries, supra note 15, at 75.
33. Id. at 74-75.
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account circumstances in which the host state defaults, repudi-
ates, or unilaterally amends the agreement in light of changed
economic and political realities. 4
Because ICSID arbitration is provided for by contract, the
consent of the parties is essential to the exercise of jurisdic-
tion.3 5 A host state's status as a Contracting State does not
automatically constitute its consent to ICSID arbitration. The
investment agreement between the private foreign investor
and the host state must independently provide for ICSID arbi-
tration. 6 The agreement to arbitrate, however, need not take
the form of an arbitration clause written into the contract gov-
erning the underlying transaction,3 7 but may be expressed by
an exchange of letters or may result from an offer to arbitrate
by one party that is subsequently accepted by the other. 8
Thus, the ICSID Convention does not require a specific type of
instrument evidencing the agreement. The consent must
merely be in writing.3 1
Once the parties have given their consent to ICSID arbi-
34. Id. The justifications for these defaults, repudiations and unilateral amend-
ments may include assertions:
1) that a predecessor government lacked the right or power to enter into the
agreement or to make the commitment in question, 2) that the agreement to
arbitrate was not legally authorized, 3) that repudiation by the host state is
justified because of breach or default by the investor, 4) that outright repu-
diation and expropriation is required by a new political or economic policy,
and 5) that supervening regulatory legislation justifies cancellation of spe-
cific exemptions, privileges, or concessions granted in the investment agree-
ment.
Id. at 74-75.
35. See id. at 42.
36. Delaume, ICSID Arbitration: Practical Considerations, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 101 (1984).
Ratification of the ICSID Convention by a Contracting State "constitutes only an
expression of its willingness to make use of the ICSID machinery." Id. at 104. Ratify-
ing the ICSID Convention, therefore, does not oblige a Contracting State to settle all
international investment disputes through ICSID. Id.
37. de Vries, supra note 15, at 64-77. An arbitration clause written into the con-
tract is referred to as a clause compromissoire. Id. at 49. It is drafted in anticipation of a
possible dispute that may arise out of the transaction contemplated by. the main con-
tract. Id.
38. See Delaume, supra note 26, at 792.
39. See ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 25(1). Article 25(1) provides in
relevant part that -[t]he jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute
arising directly out of an investment ... which the parties to the dispute consent in
writing to submit to the Centre.'" Id. (emphasis added).
ICSID ARBITRATION
tration, however, neither may withdraw it unilaterally.' Arti-
cle 25(1) of the ICSID Convention permits an arbitral tribunal
to proceed to an award despite the failure of one party to ap-
pear.4 Thus, both parties are forestalled from simply ignoring
the other's request for arbitration.
Due to the complex nature of international investment
disputes, their settlement usually takes a long period of time.42
Accordingly, provisional measures are often required to pre-
vent the destruction of the object of the dispute, which could
render the award ineffective or illusory.43 In commercial arbi-
tration proceedings, it is a general rule that, unless the parties
have otherwise agreed, provisional measures must be re-
quested from the national courts.4 4 In keeping with the exclu-
sive nature of ICSID arbitration, however, article 47 of the IC-
SID Convention provides that provisional measures may be
recommended, but not ordered, by ICSID arbitral tribunals.
45
The parties may seek provisional measures judicially only if the
parties have expressly stipulated to this in the arbitration
clause recording their consent to ICSID arbitration.46
Although an ICSID arbitral tribunal cannot order provisional
measures, the tribunal, in making its final award, may consider
40. See id., art. 25(1). Article 25(1) provides in relevant part that "[w]hen the
parties have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally." Id.
41. Id. art. 25(1); see also id. art. 45(2). Article 45(2) provides that
[i]f a party fails to appear or to present his case at any stage of the proceed-
ings the other party may request the Tribunal to deal with the questions
submitted to it and to render an award. Before rendering an award, the
Tribunal shall notify, and grant a period of grace to, the party failing to
appear or to present its case, unless it is satisfied that that party does not
intend to do so.
Id.
42. Lalive, The First 'World Bank' Arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco)-Some
Legal Problems, 1980 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 123, 132; Masood, Provisional Measures of Pro-
tection in Arbitration under the World Bank Convention, 1 DELHI L. REV. 138 (1972).
43. Lalive, supra note 42, at 132-33.
44. Id. at 132.
45. See ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 47. Article 47 provides that
"[e]xcept as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the
circumstances so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be
taken to preserve the respective rights of either party." Id.
46. See Arbitration Rules II, supra note 7, Rule 39. Arbitration Rule 39, which
governs the recommendation of provisional measures, has now been tightened.
Parra, supra note 7, at 6. Parties to an ICSID arbitration who wish to request provi-
sional measures from the courts are required to stipulate their wish in the agreement
recording their consent. Arbitration Rules II, supra note 7, Rule 39.
1986]
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the parties' willingness to comply with the recommendation.47
Each Contracting State to the ICSID Convention agrees to
enforce an ICSID award as if it were a final judgment of its own
court.48 Pursuant to article 55 of the ICSID Convention, how-
ever, such agreement is subject to the rules of sovereign immu-
nity prevailing in the country in which execution is sought. 49
This is not to say that article 55 relieves a Contracting State of
its obligations under the ICSID Convention. ° The Con-
tracting State should not invoke its immunity for the sole pur-
pose of thwarting the enforcement of an ICSID award. 5 If the
Contracting State were to do so, the private party award-credi-
tor 5 2 would be free to request assistance from its own govern-
ment, which could then bring a claim on its behalf in the Inter-
national Court of Justice.55
47. See Arbitration Rules I, supra note 7, Rule 39, Note B; Lalive, supra note 42,
at 134-37. That a provisional measure may only be recommended should not eclipse
the fact that it is likely to be followed:
The psychological climate prevailing within the framework of the interna-
tional adjudicatory regime established by the [ICSID] Convention on the
bedrock of the principles of good faith and pacta sunt servanda is likely to
make the parties comply with protective measures even though they will
only be "recommended" and not "ordered" by the Tribunal.
Masood, supra note 42, at 146.
48. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 54(1). Article 54(1) provides in rele-
vant part that "[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant
to [the ICSID] Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed
by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that
State." Id. The first award to be enforced by a national court is the one handed down
in Soci~t6 Benvenuti & Bonfant v. Gouvernement de la R6publique Populaire du
Congo. Judgment of June 6, 1981, Cour d'appel, Paris, 108 J. DROIT INT'L 843
(1981), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 878 (1981) (English translation). The Paris Court of
Appeals held that the role of national courts, in giving recognition to ICSID awards,
is restricted to ascertaining the authenticity of the award as certified by ICSID's Sec-
retary-General. Such courts should not entertain any consideration of sovereign im-
munity. Judgment of June 6, 1981, Cour d'appel, Paris, 108 J. DROIT INT'L 843
(1981), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 878 (1981) (English translation); see Delaume, supra note
28, at 73-74.
49. ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 55. Article 55 provides that "[niothing
in Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Con-
tracting State relating to immunity of that State or of any foreign State from execu-
tion." Id.; see Delaume, supra note 28, at 74-76.
50. Delaume, supra note 28, at 74-76.
51. Id.
52. An award-creditor is the party in whose favor the ICSID tribunal renders an
award. See Delaume, supra note 28, at 75.
53. Pursuant to article 64 of the ICSID Convention, the Contracting State whose
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II. THE AMCO ASIA CORP. v. INDONESIA DECISION ON
REQUEST FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES
A. The Facts Behind the Decision
In January of 1981, the Claimants54 -Amco Asia, P.T.
Amco, and Pan American-filed, with the Secretary-General of
ICSID, a request for arbitration against Indonesia for settle-
ment of a dispute arising out of the Claimants' hotel invest-
ment in Indonesia.55 The Claimants alleged that their invest-
ment had been seized by the Indonesian Government in an
armed, military action. 56 Indonesia contested ICSID'sjurisdic-
tion over the dispute.5 7 However, the ICSID Tribunal that was
national is the award-creditor would be permitted to submit the issue to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. See Delaume, supra note 28, at 74-76.
54. For a discussion of the Claimants' relationship to each other and to the In-
donesian Government, see supra note 10.
55. Amco Asia Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 352, 361. In 1968, Amco Asia negotiated and
entered into a lease and management agreement, through P.T. Amco, with P.T.
Wisma Kartika (P.T. Wisma), an Indonesian corporation, for the land on which Amco
Asia planned to build the hotel. Indonesian real property law, codified in the Basic
Agrarian Law of 1960, does not recognize the concept of freehold land rights. See
Soemitro, supra note 10, at 508. Instead, Indonesian law divides real property rights
into distinct elements that may be separately held and regulated. See id. The most
comprehensive of such rights, the right of ownership, or hak milik, may only be ac-
quired, as a general rule, by natural persons of Indonesian citizenship. S. GAUTAMA &
R. HORNICK, AN INTRODUCTION TO INDONESIAN LAW 83-84 (1983). However, Indone-
sian law does provide exceptions to this rule, making it possible for certain Indone-
sian legal entities, such as state-owned banks and cooperative associations, to acquire
a hak milik. Id. Under the 1967 Foreign Investment Law, foreign-controlled compa-
nies established under Indonesian law, however, were permitted to acquire the right
to build, or hak guna bangunan, which is identical to the hak milik, except that its dura-
tion is limited to 30 years. Id. at 85-86. P.T. Amco could have purchased from P.T.
Wisma the land where the hotel was to be built, subject to a hak guna bangunan. The
parties agreed, however, that P.T. Wisma would instead lease the land to P.T. Amco.
See Amco Asia Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 375. Construction of the hotel was subsequently
completed, and the hotel was operated and managed by P.T. Amco until 1980, when
the Indonesian army allegedly seized the hotel. Id. at 352.
56. Amco Asia Corp., 23 I.L.M. at 352. Prior to the alleged seizure of the Claim-
ants' investment, the relationship between them and P.T. Wisma had deteriorated:
P.T. Wisma had brought suit against P.T. Amco in the Jakarta District Court for
breach of the lease and management agreement. Id. at 378-79. During the Jakarta
court proceedings P.T. Amco made no attempt to invoke ICSID arbitration. Id.
57. Id. at 353-54. Indonesia filed a counter-memorial to the Claimants' request
arguing that 1) it had not consented to ICSID jurisdiction relating to any dispute
between Indonesia and Amco Asia nor to any dispute between Indonesia and Pan
American, 2) it had not consented to P.T. Amco being treated as a United States
national for the purposes of the ICSID Convention, 3) P.T. Wisma was not an instru-
mentality of the Indonesian government, and 4) P.T. Amco had waived its consent to
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convened to hear the dispute rejected Indonesia's arguments
and handed down an award on jurisdiction in favor of the
Claimants.58
Approximately three months before the ICSID Tribunal
handed down its award on jurisdiction, the majority share-
holder of Pan American released statements about the dispute
to the Business Standard, an English-language newspaper pub-
lished in Hong Kong.59 An article about the dispute was sub-
sequently published on the front page of the newspaper, dis-
cussing the business relationship between Amco Asia and P.T.
Wisma-which held title to the land on which the hotel was
built-and mentioning a lease and management agreement
signed between P.T. Amco and P.T. Wisma.6 ° The article also
ICSID jurisdiction, with respect to the alleged seizure of the hotel and termination of
the lease agreement with P.T. Wisma, because a decision on these matters had been
handed down by the District Court in Jakarta. Id.
58. Id. at 356-83. Indonesia argued that although it consented to ICSID arbitra-
tion, its consent was valid-if at all-only with respect to P.T. Amco and not to Amco
Asia. Id. at 354. The Tribunal held that article IX of the Investment Application,
submitted by Amco Asia, constituted Indonesia's written consent, required by article
25(1) of the ICSID Convention, to ICSID arbitration. Id. at 364-71. This writing, the
Tribunal reasoned, was sufficient to show that the parties had agreed to ICSID arbi-
tration because the arbitration clause was intended to protect the foreign investor. Id.
at 369. Thus, although article IX did not explicitly mention Amco Asia as the pro-
tected party, any other interpretation of the clause would have been illogical. Id.
Amco Asia's right to invoke article IX of the Investment Application is assignable
with the investment. Id. at 371-73. This right, the Tribunal concluded, inhered in the
shares of P.T. Amco and is accordingly transferable with those shares. Id. Thus, sub-
ject only to Indonesia's consent, a transfer of P.T. Amco's shares effectively trans-
ferred the right to invoke article IX of the Investment Application to Pan American.
Id. The Tribunal also ruled that article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention controlled
the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the dispute with respect to P.T. Amco. Id. at 356-64.
For article 25(2)(b) to be applicable, the Claimants only needed to establish that P.T.
Amco was a juridical person of Indonesian citizenship, which was under foreign con-
trol. Id. The Tribunal concluded that the facts met both of these requirements. Id.
Because the Claimants had brought action against Indonesia for the Govern-
ment's alleged act of expropriation or nationalization, and not for a breach of con-
tract between P.T. Amco and P.T. Wisma, the tribunal also found legally irrelevant
Indonesia's contention that P.T. Wisma was not an instrumentality of the Indonesian
Government. See id. at 374. Finally, the Tribunal found that the Claimants had not
waived their rights to ICSID arbitration purely because of P.T. Amco's participation
in the proceedings before the Jakarta District Court because the parties to the two
actions were different. Indonesia had not been made a party to the Jakarta proceed-
ings. On November 21, 1984, the Tribunal handed down an award on the merits.
Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. 1022 (1985).
59. Cheng, HK Firm's Clash with Indonesia goes to ICSID, Business Standard, June
27, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
60. Id.
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contained a description of P.T. Wisma's corporate structure
and its relationship to the Indonesian army.6' The article al-
leged that P.T. Wisma was run by a group of army generals
acting through Inkopad, an army cooperative association.
62
The article went on to describe the military takeover of the ho-
tel and the removal of P.T. Amco's business files.63 The article
alleged that the reason behind the takeover was the Indonesian
army's dissatisfaction with the profit-sharing scheme then in
force between the parties. 64 The takeover was, therefore, al-
legedly part of a strategy to coerce Amco Asia into concluding
a new profit-sharing arrangement that was more lucrative for
the Indonesian army.65
In September of 1983, Indonesia filed a request with the
ICSID Tribunal for a recommendation of provisional meas-
ures, pursuant to article 47 of the ICSID Convention, 66 to en-
join the Claimants from taking any action that might possibly
aggravate or extend the dispute brought before the Tribunal.6 7
In particular, Indonesia requested the Tribunal to recommend
that the Claimants "abstain from promoting, stimulating, or
instigating the publication of propaganda ... outside [the] Tri-
bunal ... calculated to discourage foreign investment in Indo-
nesia. '"68 Indonesia argued, inter alia, that the Claimants' ac-
tion in releasing statements to the press was inconsistent with
the spirit of confidentiality that normally imbues international
arbitral proceedings. 69 The Claimants filed a reply to Indone-
61. Id.
62. Id. Although the published decisions of the ICSID Tribunal briefly dis-
cussed the connection between P.T. Wisma and the Indonesian Army, the Tribunal
never released details of that connection. Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 1022.
63. See Cheng, supra note 59, at 1, col. 2.
64. See id. The article also discussed matters that would have been more readily
accessible to the public, such as the laws governing foreign investments in Indonesia.
65. Id.
66. See ICSID Convention, supra note 4, art. 47.
67. Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. 365.
68. Id. at 365. Specifically, Indonesia invoked article 48(5) of the ICSID Con-
vention as well as Rules 48(4), 37(2), 6(2), 15 and 31(2) of the Arbitration Rules. See
infra notes 94-110 and accompanying text; see also Arbitration Rules I, supra note 7.
In addition, Indonesia argued that the Claimants had violated article 26 of the ICSID
Convention by seeking remedies exclusive of the ICSID Tribunal. See supra note 26
and accompanying text. Indonesia also argued that the Claimants had violated the
good faith requirement inhering in all international proceedings. See Amico Asia Corp.,
24 I.L.M. at 366.
69. Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 366.
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sia's request in October of 1983, setting forth affirmative de-
fenses.70
B. The Ruling of the ICSID Tribunal
The ICSID Tribunal rejected Indonesia's request and re-
fused to recommend provisional measures. 7 1 The Tribunal
concluded that the Business Standard article constituted no ac-
tual harm to Indonesia and did not aggravate or exacerbate the
dispute between the parties.72 The Tribunal pointed out that
the article was based upon the personal opinions of a Pan
American shareholder and, as such, was not presented as con-
taining undisputed facts."
The Tribunal agreed with the Claimants that Indonesia
had failed to specify the rights that were to be protected by the
provisional measures, as required by Rule 39(1) of the Arbitra-
tion Rules. 4 In addition, the Tribunal reasoned that the rights
70. Id. at 366-67. The Claimants argued that "the ICSID Convention and Arbi-
tration Rules do not prohibit individual parties from discussing the case and the sta-
tus of the arbitration, publicly or otherwise." Id. In addition, the Claimants pointed
out that Indonesia had failed to specify the "rights to be preserved" by the requested
provisional measures, as required by Rule 39(1) of the Arbitration Rules. Id. See infra
notes 74-78 and accompanying text. Claimants argued that the provisional measures
requested were without precedent either in previous ICSID proceedings or in past
cases presented to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ). Moreover, the proposed provisional order, the Claim-
ants argue, would have been impossible to police because a large number of people
in the Indonesian Government, as well as among the shareholders of Amco Asia and
Pan American, had become privy to the case. See Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 367.
71. Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 367-69.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 367-68. Rule 39(1) requires the requesting party to "specify the rights
to be preserved . . . and the circumstances that require such measures." Indonesia
failed to specify those rights. That "circumstances" must require such measures indi-
cates that the test for recommending provisional measures is an objective one. Thus,
at a minimum, Indonesia would have had to show how the Claimants' actions had
compromised its rights.
74. See Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 368. At the December 8, 1964, meeting of
the Legal Committee on Settlement of Investment Disputes (Legal Committee), the
delegates agreed that the types of provisional measures that the ICSID tribunals
could recommend were those provided by the "formulation of Article 41 of the Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice." Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee
Meeting, December 8, Morning, Doc. SID/LC/SR/16, reprinted in 2 CONVENTION ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER
STATES: DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE CON-
VENTION, pt. 2, 812 (1970) [hereinafter 2 CONVENTION DOCUMENTS].
The ICJ "requires some evidence, as distinct from mere speculation, of prejudice to
the alleged rights of the applicant." Goldsworthy, Interim Measures of Protection in the
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that were the subject of the underlying dispute could not have
been threatened by the publication of articles similar to that
published in the Business Standard.75 The Tribunal conceded
that a large press campaign may have been calculated to have
an adverse impact upon the Indonesian economy, the Claim-
ants being aware of Indonesia's constant need for infusion of
foreign capital.76 However, Rule 39(1) refers to those rights
that are the subject matter of the dispute, and not to abstract
general rights.77 Thus, provisional measures may have been
proper in this case, but only if the rights had been specified
International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 258, 270 (1974) (emphasis added). In
the Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1957 I.CJ. 105, 112, for example, the ICJ re-
fused to grant provisional measures requested by Switzerland to enjoin the United
States from disposing of the disputed property because the United States could not
sell the property without a judicial inquiry in United States courts. Goldsworthy,
supra at 270-71. In the Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 105, on the
other hand, the ICJ granted provisional measures requested by Australia to enjoin
the French Government from conducting nuclear tests on the basis of "credible sci-
entific evidence, in particular the Reports of the United Nations Scientific Committee
on the Effects of Atomic Radiation between 1958 and 1972." Goldsworthy, supra at
271. For a history of the Legal Committee, see infra note 88 and accompanying text.
75. Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 368. The Claimants argued that they had "no
intention of discouraging foreign investment [in Indonesia], and [had] no power to
do so." Id. at 367.
76. See id.
77. See Arbitration Rules I, supra note 7, Rule 39(1). Opinions of the delegates
to the Consultative Meeting of Legal Experts in Santiago, Chile [Feb. 3-7, 1964],
concerning the purpose of provisional measures, all indicate that ICSID tribunals
should only recommend provisional measures to protect rights directly related to the
dispute in question. Settlement of Investment Disputes Consultative Meeting of Legal Experts,
Santiago, Chile, Feb. 3-7, 1964-Summary Record of Proceedings, Doc. Z8, reprinted in 2
CONVENTION DOCUMENTS, pt. 1, 337. The ICSID tribunals only award provisional
measures to preserve the status quo at the time that a party requested the provisional
measures. Id. They are also intended "to ensure that a party did not take action that
would frustrate a possible award" and "to safeguard the rights which the parties in-
voked." Id. Precedents set by the PCIJ also indicate that provisional measures "are
designed to protect rights, but only those rights which are the subject matter of the
principal action will receive protection." Goldsworthy, supra note 74, at 272. Thus, in
the case Concerning the Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority (Ger. v.
Pol.), 1933 P.C.IJ. (ser. A/B) No. 58 (July 29), the PCIJ denied Germany's request
for interim measures of protection to prevent Poland's application of its agrarian
reform. In that principal action, Germany alleged that Polish nationals of German
origin were being discriminated against as a result of the reform. Id. at 176. Germany
sought reparations on their behalf for the detriment they suffered as a result of this
discrimination. Id. at 178. The interim protection, however, was requested to cover
the possibility of future discrimination, which was not at issue in the principal case.
Id; see Goldsworthy, supra note 74, at 272. It could be argued here that Indonesia
sought to protect a right not directly related to the dispute, but instead sought to
protect its interest in future foreign investments. SeeAmco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 365.
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and had related to the hotel investment itself.78
The Tribunal also agreed with the Claimants when it con-
cluded that the publication of the article was not inconsistent
with the spirit of confidentiality in arbitration proceedings be-
cause neither the ICSID Convention nor its Arbitration Rules
prevent the parties themselves from revealing their case.79
The Tribunal failed to specify any authority upon which it
based its conclusion. The Tribunal may have been influenced
by the publication of a newspaper article8 ° and a book"' in In-
donesia, describing the dispute in greater detail. The two pub-
lications had appeared prior to the publication of the Business
Standard article.
The Amco Asia Corp. decision raises serious questions about
the role of confidentiality in ICSID arbitral proceedings. IC-
SID provisions protecting the parties' right to confidentiality 2
would be rendered meaningless if individual parties were al-
lowed to divulge information about the dispute to the press
unilaterally. These provisions were largely intended to safe-
guard the parties' confidential business information intro-
duced as evidence in the course of the arbitral proceedings.8
The provisions would be logical if it is understood that publi-
cation of information relating to the dispute may be made only
if both parties agree to it. Accordingly, the Tribunal's decision
78. Cf. Holiday Inns/Occidental Petroleum v. Government of Morocco, ICSID
Case No. ARB/72/1. For a discussion of the case, see Lalive, supra note 42, at 132-
37. The Moroccan Government filed a request with the Moroccan courts for a sum-
mary procedure known as a referi that entitles it to take all the measures necessary to
have the construction of the hotels resumed and completed at the expense of the
Holiday Inns Group. Id. at 133 n.5. A recommendation of provisional measures was
requested by the claimant Holiday Inns Group and granted by the ICSID Tribunal.
Id. at 136. "Both Parties are invited to abstain from any measure incompatible with
the upholding of the Contract and to make sure that the action already taken should
not result in any consequences in the future which would go against such uphold-
ing." Id. at 137.
79. See Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 368.
80. Sengketa BKPM Dengan PT Amco Telan Biaya Rp 838Juta, Surabaya Post, June
16, 1982, at 8, col. 3.
81. S. GAUTAMA, HUKUM PERDATA INTERNASIONAL HUKUM YANG HIDUP 38-51
(1983).
82. See infra notes 88-110 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Arbitration Rules I, supra note 7, Rules 6(2), 15, and 31(2). ICSID's
rules on confidentiality certainly could not have been intended to keep secret the
existence of a dispute between the parties because all requests for arbitration filed
with ICSID are regularly published pursuant to Regulation 22(1) of ICSID's Admin-
istrative and Financial Regulations.
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is subject to serious criticisms. The decision would be sound,
only if it could be shown that confidentiality plays a secondary
role in ICSID arbitration.
III. THE ROLE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN ICSID
ARBITRATION: A CRITICAL EVALUATION
Because ICSID arbitration is largely a matter of contract
between the parties to the dispute, it is not unreasonable for
the parties to assume that the the public should be excluded
from the arbitral proceedings.8 4 Of course, parties to a dispute
may agree to ignore ICSID's rules of confidentiality. For ex-
ample, Rule 48(4) of ICSID's Arbitration Rules does not pro-
hibit the parties from publishing the award, should they agree
to do so. 5
Nevertheless, the ICSID Arbitration Rules, and those of
many other permanent arbitration institutions, do create a
presumption in favor of confidentiality.8 6 Thus, unless the
Claimants and Indonesia expressly agreed to publicize certain
aspects of their dispute, it is not unreasonable to assume that
they submitted their dispute to ICSID with the expectation that
it would be kept confidential. Indonesia's request for provi-
sional measures in this case was therefore not without founda-
tion. Insofar as the Tribunal's decision to deny the provisional
measures disregarded the parties' expectations, that decision
was inconsistent with the spirit of confidentiality that imbues
arbitral proceedings.
The inconsistency of the Tribunal's decision with the
spirit of confidentiality does not necessarily mean, however,
that the decision was incorrect. There is no precedent among
ICSID cases of a recommendation of provisional measures of
the type requested. 7 Thus, an examination of the drafting his-
tory of article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention and the Arbitra-
tion Rules is essential to determining whether the Tribunal vi-
84. See Jakubowsky, Reflections on the Philosophy of International Comnmercial Arbitra-
tion and Conciliation, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM PIETER SANDERS
182 J. Schultsz & A. van den Berg eds. 1982). Arbitral awards should therefore be
kept confidential as they constitute, by inference, a contract between the parties. Id.
85. See inJia notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
86. See injo notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
87. The ICJ and PCIJ cases also do not supply a precedent for applying a gag
order in this instance.
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olated the letter, if not the spirit, of ICSID's rules on confiden-
tiality.
A. The ICSID Convention and Arbitration Rules on Confidentiality
1. Drafting History of Article 48(5)
The question of whether ICSID would have the authority
to publish awards was not hotly debated by the Legal Commit-
tee on Settlement of Investment Disputes (Legal Commit-
tee)."8 Indeed, the question was not considered until fairly late
in the drafting process.89 However, the Legal Committee
voted in favor of a presumption of party autonomy on the sub-
ject. 90
The intention of the Legal Committee was to determine
what ICSID, and not the parties to an ICSID arbitration, would
be permitted to do with respect to the publication of arbitral
awards. 9 The drafting history of article 48(5) supports the
Tribunal's conclusion in Amco Asia Corp.9 2 that the ICSID Con-
vention does not prohibit the parties themselves from re-
vealing their case. Given the Legal Committee's respect for
88. See Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting, December 8, Morning, Doc.
SID/LC/SR/16, reprinted in 2 CONVENTION DOCUMENTS, pt. 2, 812, 817. For the his-
tory of the Legal Committee on Settlement of Investment Disputes (Legal Commit-
tee), see Formulation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of Other States, in 1 CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT Dis-
PUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES: ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION 2, 8 (1970). The
Legal Committee was convened in Washington, D.C. and met on 22 occassions be-
tween November 23 and December 11, 1964. Representatives from 61 countries sat
on the Legal Committee. Id. at 8. The official function of the Legal Committee was to
act as an advisory organ to the Executive Directors of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank), under whose sponsorship the IC-
SID Convention was formulated. Id. In practice, the Legal Committee carefully con-
sidered the First Draft of the Convention on an article-by-article basis. Id. Although
it could not formally vote upon any specific provision of the Draft Convention, the
Legal Committee attempted to reach a consensus among its members with respect to
each provision. Id. Once the Legal Committee reached a consensus, the Drafting
Sub-Committee, appointed by the Chairman of the Legal Committee, would consider
the provision. Id. The Legal Committee published the Revised Draft of the Conven-
tion on December 11, 1964. Id.
89. See Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting, December 8, Morning, supra
note 74, at 817-18. The First Draft of the Convention had been silent on the subject
of confidentiality. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 24 I.L.M. at 368.
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the principle of party autonomy,93 the Tribunal's conclusion is
not inconsistent with the Legal Committee's concern for the
preservation of the confidentiality of awards.
2. The Arbitration Rules
In Amco Asia Corp., the breach of confidentiality was com-
mitted by the parties, and not by ICSID or the Tribunal. The
Arbitration Rules, however, apply only to the conduct of the
tribunals. For example, Rule 6(2) requires the arbitrators to
keep confidential all information to which they have been
made privy as a result of their participation in the arbitral pro-
ceedings.9 4 Similarly, Rule 15(1) states that the Tribunal
should not divulge its deliberations to the public.95 Nor do
Rule 37(2)96 and Rule 48(4)97 regulate the conduct of the par-
ties. Both simply state that ICSID may not publish the award
without the consent of the parties.9" Rule 3 1(2) delegates the
authority to the tribunal, subject to the parties' consent, to de-
cide who may attend the hearings.99 The rule shifts to the
tribunals the responsibility of protecting the parties' rights to
93. See Summary Proceedings of the Legal Committee Meeting, December 8, Morning, supra
note 74, at 817-18.
94. Arbitration Rules I, supra note 7, Rule 6(2). The Rule provides in pertinent
part that all arbitrators "shall keep confidential all information coming to [their]
knowledge .... " Id.
95. Id., Rule 15(1) provides that "[t]he deliberations of the Tribunal shall take
place in private and remain secret." Note A to Rule 15 states, however, that the
reason behind the rule was primarily a concern with assuring the independence of
the arbitrators and with strengthening the collective character of the Tribunal. Id.
96. Id., Rule 37(2) provided in relevant parts that "[t]he minutes of the hearing
... shall not be published without the consent of the parties." Rule 37(2) has been
abolished and replaced by Rule 20, which allows the parties to agree beforehand
upon the manner in which the records are to be kept. Parra, supra note 7, at 5.
97. Arbitration Rules I, supra note 7, Rule 48(4). The Rule provides that the
"Centre shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties." Rule 48(4)
has been amended and now also provides that the "Centre may, however, include in
its publications excerpts of the legal rules applied by the Tribunal." Arbitration
Rules II, supra note 7, Rule 48(4).
98. Arbitration Rules I, supra note 7, Rule 37(2) & Rule 48(4). See Administra-
tive and Financial Regulations, Reg. 22(1). ICSID may therefore arrange for their
publication with the agreement of the parties. The publication of awards, minutes
and other records (in "an appropriate form") is governed by Regulation 22(1).
99. Arbitration Rules I, supra note 7, Rule 31(2). The Rule provides that "[tihe
Tribunal shall decide, with the consent of the parties, which other persons besides
the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their
testimony, and officers of the Tribunal may attend the hearings." Id.
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confidentiality.' 00 Although these Rules reflect a concern for
confidentiality, it is apparent that they were designed primarily
to regulate the conduct of the tribunals, not of the parties.
The only direct reference in the Arbitration Rules to the
conduct of the parties with respect to confidentiality is note F
to Rule 30,101 which permits the parties to publish their plead-
ings. 10 Because the Business Standard article related only the
personal opinions of a Pan American shareholder,10 3 it may be
comparable, in some respects, to the Claimants' pleadings.
Note F, however, also imposes a good faith requirement 0 4
upon the parties by urging them to refrain from publishing
their pleadings if they anticipate that publication may exacer-
bate the dispute. 10 5 In short, the parties should construe the
right to publish their pleadings in light of Rules 37(2)1"6 and48(4). 107
In Amco Asia Corp., the Tribunal concluded that the publi-
cation of the Business Standard article did not aggravate or exac-
erbate the legal dispute brought before it."' 8 At best, this con-
clusion is dubious. Insofar as the publication of the article
deepened the misunderstanding between the parties, it did ex-
acerbate the dispute. The good faith rule of international pro-
ceedings..9 should have compelled the Tribunal at least to ad-
vocate restraint to the Claimants. However, it is likely that, be-
100. Id., Rule 31(2). Note C to Rule 31(2) provides, moreover, that "as a matter
of principle, arbitration proceedings should not be public." Id.
101. Id., Rule 30. The Rule lists the pleadings that the parties are required to
submit to the tribunal, e.g. the memorial and counter-memorial.
102. Id., Rule 30. Note F to Rule 30 provides that "[tlhe parties are not prohib-
ited from publishing their pleadings. They may, however, come to an understanding
to refrain from doing so, particularly if they feel that publication may exacerbate the
dispute (in this connection, see [a]rticle 48(5) and Rules 37(2) and 48(4))." Id.
103. See Amco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 367.
104. For the good faith requirement, see Cremades, The Impact of International
Arbitration on the Development of Business Law, 31 AM. J. CoMP. L. 526, 527 (1983):
Arbitral decision making has developed good faith as an overriding rule of
international contracting .... It is the modus vivendi that requires a debtor
and creditor to work as partners rather than as adversaries. Good faith is a
regulatory norm through which arbitrators apply equitable principles as the
supreme rule of contractual interpretation.
Id.
105. See supra note 102.
106. See supra note 96.
107. See supra note 97.
108. See Amco Asia Cop., 24 I.L.M. at 368-69.
109. Id.; see Cremades, supra note 104, at 527.
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cause Indonesia had failed to prevent its own nationals from
publicly discussing the dispute, the Tribunal concluded that
Indonesia itself had violated the good faith rule."
There are equally strong arguments for and against the
Tribunal's decision. One may reasonably argue that the Tribu-
nal's decision was incorrect because it is inconsistent with the
spirit of confidentiality normally associated with international
arbitration. At the same time, if one considers the drafting his-
tory of article 48(5) and the Arbitration Rules, there is an
equally strong case for the technical correctness of the Tribu-
nal's decision. Whether the decision is proper, therefore, de-
pends largely upon whether the considerations for confidenti-
ality are stronger or weaker than the arguments against it.
B. The Considerations in Favor of Confidentiality
At least three considerations favor the retention of IC-
SID's rules on confidentiality. First, ICSID arbitration is a pro-
cedure interpartes; that is, the arbitration agreement constitutes
a private contract between the parties. Accordingly, it is im-
portant that the private nature of their arrangement be
respected."' Second, the rules protect the confidentiality of
business information and technological secrets.' 12 Third, con-
fidentiality is desirable because it often prevents third parties
from learning of the very existence of the dispute."t 3 In the
110. See Amnco Asia Corp., 24 I.L.M. at 368.
111. See Jakubowsky, supra note 84, at 182.
112. Forrestal, supra note 23, at 15. However, one commentator has argued that
absolute secrecy can never be guaranteed. Lew, The Case for the Publication of Arbitra-
tion Award&, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION: LIBER AMICORUM PIETER SANDERS 223, 224
(J. Schultsz & A. van den Berg eds. 1982). For example, it is highly probable that the
winning party may have to have the award enforced in a national court. "[W]hen
enforcement of an award is sought, either at the place of arbitration or in another
country, the imprimatur of judicial confirmation may be unavoidable." de Vries,
supra note 15, at 62. On the other hand, the losing party may refuse to accept the
arbitrators' award and seek to have it set aside through judicial proceedings. In
either case, "the relevant facts of the contract between the parties and the dispute
will become a matter of public record." Lew, supra at 224.
113. Forrestal, supra note 23, at 55. One commentator has argued, however,
that "in a small commercial community the currency of an arbitration is in any event
likely to become known, whereas in a large one litigation may well pass unnoticed."
Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, 1980J. Bus. L. 164, 165. In the context of
ICSID arbitration, this concern is irrelevant because all requests for arbitration are
published as a matter of course. Administration and Financial Regulations, Reg.
22(l). Moreover, the private and confidential nature of arbitration often deters gov-
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context of many modern transnational investment agreements,
the second of these three considerations is especially impor-
tant. 1 4
The type of transnational investments covered by ICSID
arbitration agreements has changed enormously." 5 At the
time that the ICSID Convention was drafted, most transna-
tional investments took the form of joint ventures, concession
and establishment agreements, or simply loans made to for-
eign public entities by private financial institutions." 6
More recent investments covered by ICSID arbitration
agreements, however, have included such arrangements as
contracts for service and management, 7 construction con-
tracts, 18 and turn-key contracts.' 1 9 Many of these new types of
association between investors and foreign governments in-
volve transfers of technical data and know-how. 120  Indeed,
some countries insist that some form of technology transfer be
ernments from approving it as a method of resolving certain types of disputes, such
as antitrust claims, because to do so would conflict with public policy. See, e.g., Pitof-
sky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072 (1969); Loevinger,
Antitrust Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1085 (1969). But see Mitsub-
ishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985); Note,
Application of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards:
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 8 FORDIAM INT'L L.J. 194
(1984).
114. See infra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
115. Delaume, supra note 36, at 117.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp., 23 I.L.M. 351 (an agreement for the management
of an hotel); Kl6ckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Cameroon, ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/2 (a management contract to provide technical assistance for the operation
of a fertilizer plant) (excerpts of the Tribunal's decision were published in Paulsson,
The ICSID Kl6ckner v. Cameroon Award. The Duties of Partners in North-South Economic
Development Agreements, 1 J. INT'L ARB. 145 (1984)); Seditex Engineering Beratung-
sgesellschaft mbH v. Madagascar, ICSID Case No. CONC/82/1 (a management con-
tract for the operation of a cotton mill) (proceedings terminated at Claimant's re-
quest).
118. See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp., 23 I.L.M. 351 (hotel construction); K6ckner, supra
note 117 (construction of a fertilizer plant).
119. See Gantt v. Van der Hoek, 251 S.C. 307, 31l, 162 S.E.2d 267, 270-71
(1968). The court defined a turn-key contract as an agreement in which a builder
agrees to complete construction and installation to the point of readiness for occu-
pancy. Id. One of the five agreements entered into by the foreign investors and the
host country in Kl&-kner, supra note 117, was a turn-key contract.
120. Delaume, supra note 36, at 119.
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effected in conjunction with any foreign investment.' 2 '
Moreover, parties to investment agreements that exclu-
sively involve technology tranfers in such areas as the develop-
ment of agriculture, tourism, and the electronics and air trans-
portation industries have begun to incorporate ICSID arbitra-
tion clauses into their contracts. 22 Ambiguities inherent in
the complex nature of these arrangements create many difficul-
ties that have to be resolved by arbitration. 12  The absence of
a confidentiality requirement on ICSID's part would cause a
public disclosure of secret technical data and expertise. 124
Publicizing the existence of a dispute may also jeopardize the
long-term cooperation envisioned by the parties.12 5
C. The Considerations Against Confidentiality
1. Confidentiality Conceals the Real Merits of ICSID
Arbitration
Until recently, the literature on ICSID has been of a schol-
arly and general nature.126 ICSID's slow start 12 7 has been at-
tributed partly to this paucity of more practical and specific
literature about the forum. 128 A 1976 survey of 490 United
States multinational corporations chosen among the 1973 For-
tune 1,000 companies 129 showed that, of the 156 executives
121. Eg., Indonesia. Presidential Decree 29/1984, Annex II, § 111(4) provides
that
(a) If a project has to be performed by a foreign contractor/ consultant be-
cause no Indonesian contractor/consultant is able to handle the project or
fulfill its technical specifications or execute it for any other reasons, then the
tender document for such a project must stipulate that the foreign contrac-
tor/ consultant work together with Indonesian contractors/consultants.
(b) The tender document/contract must indicate clearly and unequivocally
the obligation of the foreign contractor/consultant to work together with
the Indonesian contractor/consultant, as well as specify the method to be
used to effect a transfer of technology, know-how and skills.
Id. (emphasis added) (author's translation).
122. Delaume, supra note 36, at 119.
123. See id. at 118-20.
124. See R. DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 12 (1985).
125. Id.
126. Delaume, supra note 36, at 101.
127. Id. Between January 1972 and April 1981 only eleven cases had been sub-
mitted to ICSID for arbitration. See Gopal, International Centrefor Settlement of Investment
Disputes, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 591, 596 (1982).
128. Id. at 596-96.
129. The Fortune 1000 companies are those companies listed in The Fortune Direc-
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who responded, only 26 were familiar with ICSID.13 0  Since
1981, however, public awareness of ICSID has increased. Be-
tween February 1981 and September 1984, eleven cases were
submitted to ICSID-more than the total number of cases that
were submitted to ICSID in the first fifteen years of its exist-
ence.' 3 ' This increase in caseload has been credited to the in-
creased publicity effort mounted by ICSID. 132 It is just as
likely, however, that the public's increased recognition of IC-
SID is attributable to the publication, beginning in 1981, of
awards133 and commentaries 134 dealing with specific cases.
Individual experiences influence opinions about which ar-
bitral forums and institutions are best suited to certain types of
disputes. 135 Hence, parties are understandably reluctant to
submit their disputes for arbitration before tribunals with
which they have little or no familiarity. Yet parties are often
willing to rely on the experiences of others, by reviewing arbi-
tration awards handed down in other cases dealing with similar
types of agreements. 136
A requirement that an award not be published without the
consent of the parties will naturally limit the public's access to
the award and contribute to the mystification of ICSID. 137 Par-
ties unfamiliar with ICSID may therefore believe that ICSID's
to1y of the 500 Largest Industrial Coiporations, 87 Fortune 221-41 (May 1973) and The
Fortune Directory of the Second 500 Largest Industrial Corporations, 87 Fortune 156-75 (June
1973).
130. Baker & Ryans, The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID), 10J. WORLD TRADE L. 65, 71 (1976).
131. Delaume, supra note 36, at 101-02.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, Case No. ARB/81/1, 23 I.L.M. 351
(1984) (award on jurisdiction), 24 I.L.M. 365 (1985) (provisional measures), 24
I.L.M. 1022 (1985) (award on the merits); AGIP SpA v. People's Republic of Congo,
Case No. ARB/77/I, 21 I.L.M. 726 (1982) (English translation); Benvenuti &
Bonfant sr] v. People's Republic of Congo, Case No. ARB/77/2, 21 I.L.M. 740
(1982) with correction in 21 I.L.M. 1478 (1982) (English translation).
134. See, e.g., Delaume, supra note 28; Delaume, supra note 26; Lalive, supra note
42; Niggeman, The ICSID Kl6ckner v. Cameroon Award: The Dissenting Opinion, 1 J.
INr'L. ARts. 331 (1984); Note, Mlaritime International Nominees Establishment; Note, The
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Selected Case Studies, 7 INT'L
TRADE L.J. 306 (1982-83); Paulsson, supra note 117; Schmidt, supra note 21.
135. Lew, supra note 112, at 227-28.
136. Id.
137. Gopal, supra, note 127, at 597. Confidentiality also hinders the identifica-
tion of areas of the arbitration process that may be in need of revision. .ew, supra
note 112, at 228.
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reluctance to publish awards is attributable, for example, to
the unreliability of the tribunals' decisions.l131
2. Confidentiality Inhibits the Development of an ICSID
Procedural Jurisprudence
The legal issues that confront ICSID tribunals are seldom
simple; indeed, by the very nature of the agreements that give
rise to these disputes, the problems to be resolved are almost
always complex.' 39  An indication of the manner in which simi-
lar problems were solved in the past ought, therefore, to be a
welcome guide to ICSID arbitrators and parties contemplating
ICSID dispute resolution. 140 To become the premier forum
for the settlement of international investment disputes, ICSID
must insure that consistency is maintained among the deci-
sions rendered by its tribunals.' 4 ' In short, ICSID must de-
velop its own procedural jurisprudence.
The benefits that come from procedural consistency in IC-
SID arbitration will be especially useful to parties encountering
jurisdictional problems. Because ICSID arbitration is consen-
sual in nature, jurisdictional issues involve not only questions
of personal and subject matter jurisdiction but also of con-
sent. 4 2  For example, international investment agreements
have often taken a considerable amount of time to implement
and have usually involved several contractual arrangements
138. See Lew, supra note 112, at 227.
139. See infra notes 141-179 and accompanying text. Most investment agree-
ments consist of several contracts that may have been drafted at different stages of
the implementation of the investment agreement. These different contracts are not
always incorporated by reference in each of the other contracts. Consequently,
problems of consent to jurisdiction, the identity of the state party, and the nature of
the investments themselves often recur.
140. See Lew, supra note 112, at 229. Nor is the accessibility of past decisions
important only to the arbitrators and parties contemplating ICSID arbitration.
Knowledge of how tribunals have ruled in the past will also be a useful guide to
practicing lawyers involved in the negotiations of complex international investment
agreements. This is especially true of agreements involving the more modern types
of investment. It is true that one could always stipulate that the transaction con-
cerned is an investment within the meaning of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Conven-
tion. However, in the absence of more specific guidance, the difficulty of distinguish-
ing between the old and the new types of investment, or even knowing that there is
any distinction at all, may make the suggestion more difficult to implement in prac-
tice for the newcomer to the field.
141. Id.
142. See Delaume, supra note 36, at 104-08.
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that, only when construed together, constitute the agreement
between the parties. 43 It is possible that an ICSID arbitration
clause drafted in one contractual arrangement may not be re-
peated or incorporated by reference in the others. 144  The
question then becomes whether a challenge could be mounted
against ICSID jurisdiction with respect to the other agree-
ments. 145 This issue was not specifically addressed by the IC-
SID Convention or by the Arbitration Rules.
The decision in Holiday Inns/Occidental Petroleum v. Mo-
rocco 146 provided a useful precedent in this area. 147 In that
case, the parties had entered into a basic agreement, pursuant
to which the host state was to provide the financing, through
separate loan contracts, for the construction of hotels. 148 The
separate loan contracts did not incorporate ICSID arbitration
clauses but instead contained provisions designating Moroccan
courts as the proper forum for dispute resolution. 149 Morocco
objected to ICSID jurisdiction on the grounds that although
the basic agreement referred the parties to ICSID for arbitra-
tion, the dispute related to subsidiary contracts that specified
Moroccan courts as the proper forum. 5 ' The ICSID tribunal
rejected Morocco's objections and held that the dispute had
been properly brought before it.' 5 ' The issue was again raised
in Kl'ckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Cameroon.152 In that case,
the parties entered into four agreements.' 5"3 Three of the four
agreements provided for ICSID arbitration, while the fourth
referred the parties to the International Chamber of Com-
merce Court of Arbitration.1 54 Interestingly, the details of the
Holiday Inns 155 decision were made public only in 1982, the
year following the institution of arbitration proceedings in
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1, discussed in Lalive, supra note 42.
147. See id, at 155-58.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Paulsson, supra note 117, at 147-52.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1, discussed in Lalive, supra note 42.
ICSID ARBITRATION
Klckner.'6 Thus, although the ICSID tribunal in Kl"ckner re-
ferred to the Holiday Inns decision, '57 it is possible that the par-
ties themselves went to arbitration without the benefit of an
ICSID precedent.
Another jurisdictional issue that may arise is related to the
identification of the governmental party to an ICSID arbitra-
tion. '15  Ordinarily, the identity of a Contracting State is not
problematic.' 59 It could become so, however, if the foreign in-
vestor were dealing with a constituent subdivision or agency of
the Contracting State.' 6 ° The Contracting State, in these in-
stances, would have validly consented to ICSID jurisdiction
only if it had designated the subdivision or agency concerned
as eligible to assume the role of a party to an ICSID arbitra-
tion. '6 The problem does not stop there, however. Because
the implementation of an international investment agreement
usually lasts several years, the Contracting State may undergo
political and administrative changes.' 62 These changes could
eliminate or substitute the subdivision or agency that was orig-
inally a party to the ICSID arbitration agreement.' 63 To date,
an ICSID tribunal has not had occasion to resolve this issue.' 64
156. The 1980 volume of The British Year Book of International Law was not pub-
lished until 1982.
157. Paulsson, supra note 117, at 152.
158. Delaume, supra note 36, at 108-11.
159. A list of Contracting States may be easily obtained from ICSID's Secreta-
riat.
160. Delaume, supra note 36, at 108-11.
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. In the Holiday Inns case, im-
portant changes took place in the Moroccan Government. Cabinet members who
were the main promoters of the hotel construction project were replaced by ministers
who were very critical of their predecessors' negotiation of the investment agree-
ment. Lalive, supra note 42, at 129.
163. Delaume, supra note 36, at 109-10.
164. Id. The Tribunal in Kickner did not reach the issue. Pursuant to the basic
agreement in KIockner, the foreign investors were to supply and erect a fertilizer
plant, which was to be operated by a locally incorporated joint venture company (SO-
CAME). See Paulsson, supra note 117, at 147. The foreign investors had a 51 percent
equity share in SOCAME. Id. Pursuant to a turn-key contract signed by the foreign
investors and the Cameroon Government, the latter assigned all its rights under the
contract to SOCAME, which became the foreign investors' co-contractor in the place
of the Cameroon Government. Id. The Cameroon Government could therefore have
mounted a challenge to ICSID jurisdiction with respect to SOCAME. The Cameroon
Government agreed, however, to nominate SOCAME as its constituent agency for
purposes of ICSID arbitration. Id. at 148.
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However, because international investment agreements fre-
quently involve the participation of governmental agencies,16 5
this issue is likely to become a recurring problem. A published
precedent in this area would undoubtedly be useful.
The nationality of the investor poses another recurring ju-
risdictional problem.' 66 This problem has arisen when the
parties have failed to state explicitly that the locally-incorpo-
rated subsidiary of the foreign investor is to be treated as a
national of a Contracting State, other than the host state, for
the purposes of article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.' 6 7
This was an issue that was raised in Amco Asia Corp.' 68 Another
issue that may recur is whether consent by a host state to IC-
SID arbitration is transferred to a third party along with a for-
eign investor's assignment of its rights in an investment agree-
ment.' 69 This problem was also resolved by the Tribunal in
Amco Asia Corp. 170
In international investment disputes, the choice of sub-
stantive law governing the dispute may also present trouble-
some issues. I' v ' According to article 42 of the ICSID Conven-
tion, if the arbitration agreement does not explicitly provide
otherwise, an ICSID tribunal is to apply the law of the host
state. 172 Normally, choice of law should not be problematic.
However, because a great number of the Contracting States
that are party to ICSID arbitration agreements are countries
that have only recently gained their independence from Euro-
pean colonial powers, problems may surface. 173 Often, the
165. See Delaume, supra note 36, at 108-09.
166. Id. at 111-16.
167. See, e.g., MINE v. Guinea, Case No. ARB/84/4, discussed in Delaume, supra
note 26; Amco Asia Corp., Case No. ARB/81/1, 23 I.L.M. 351; Holiday Inns, Case No.
ARB/72/I, discussed in Lalive, supra note 42.
168. See supra note 58.
169. Assuming that consent to ICSID jurisdiction is freely transferable, the issue
becomes whether consent would be vitiated if the transferee is a national of the host
country. This issue was not raised in Amco Asia Corp. because Pan American was a
national of Hong Kong. 23 I.L.M. 351.
170. Delaume, supra note 36, at 115-16.
171. Paulsson, supra note 117, at 153.
172. Id.
173. To date, of the 20 cases that have been submitted to ICSID, only two did
not involve a Contracting State party that would not be considered as a less devel-
oped country (LDC): (a) Iceland in ALUSUISSE v. Iceland (Case No. ARB/83/I) and
(b) Republic of Korea in Colt Industries Operating Corp. v. Korea (Case No.
ARB/84/2).
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legacy of the colonial era to an emerging nation-state is a plu-
ralistic system of law.' 74 Secured loan transactions in Indone-
sia, for example, may be governed by European law,' 75 or by
the indigenous customary or adat law, 176 or by interpersonal
law. 177 At least one ICSID case has dealt directly with this is-
sue. 1
7 8
These examples of procedural problems serve to illustrate
that not only do procedural uncertainties abound in ICSID ar-
bitration, but that they also often recur. This is not unex-
pected, given the recent establishment of ICSID as an institu-
tion. It is perhaps a tribute to the flexibility and resilience of
the ICSID Convention that it is able to accommodate an in-
creasing variety of international investment disputes. 179 IC-
SID's reputation as a reliable and independent arbitral institu-
tion can be best served by subordinating the requirement of
confidentiality to the publication of arbitral awards.
CONCLUSION
ICSID's primary purpose is to provide an effective and
neutral forum for the settlement of international investment
disputes. 8 ° In view of the problems usually encountered in
dispute resolution in international investments,' 8 1 ICSID ful-
fills a unique function. It is the only forum specifically created
to enable private parties and foreign sovereigns to seek legal
redress against each other.
Yet, the importance of ICSID's function may be jeopard-
ized by its own rules of confidentiality.' 82 The Tribunal's re-
fusal to grant provisional measures enjoining publication of in-
174. E.g., Indonesia. S. GAUTAMA & R. HORNICK, supra note 55, at 1-21.
175. S. GAUTAMA, D. ALLAN, M. HISCOCK & D. ROEBUCK, CREDIT AND SECURITY
IN INDONESIA 83-103 (1973).
176. Id. at 104-05.
177. Id. at 110-22. Interpersonal law is a branch of Indonesian law that deter-
mines the applicable law when persons of different population groups, e.g., Euro-
pean and native Indonesian, enter into civil transactions or relations. Id. at 12.
178. In Klckner, the issue, resolved only after some difficulty, arose because of
Cameroon's dual judicial heritage, which applies both English common law and
French civil law. Paulsson, supra note 117, at 153.
179. See Delaume, supra note 36, at 117.
180. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 126-79 and accompanying text.
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formation regarding the dispute in Amco Asia Corp. has helped
to put into clearer perspective the limited utility of confidenti-
ality rules in ICSID arbitration. 83 They are, and should be,
held secondary to ICSID's primary purpose. Therefore, this
Note recommends that article 48(5) of the ICSID Convention
be changed to read: "The Centre shall publish the award, tak-
ing proper care, and in consultation with the parties, to delete
sensitive and confidential business information that may be
damaging to the parties." The amendment to Arbitration Rule
48(4) to allow the publication of excerpts of legal rules applied
by the tribunals indicates that a trend towards this practice has
already emerged. 1 84
Benjamin H. Tahyar*
183. See supra notes 54-83 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 8.
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